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New Insights on the Role of Location Advantages in International Innovation 
 
Rajneesh Narula and Grazia D. Santangelo 
 
Introduction 
Understanding the reasons why economic activity prefers to locate in certain physical spaces 
(and not in others) forms the basis of much enquiry since at least the enlightenment, and 
continues to remain so. Although the jargon in such enquiry has evolved through the centuries, 
the concern with national competitiveness has driven much of these efforts, and connected to 
this, the propensity to trade, and the ensuing issues of balance of payments and national debt. 
Nonetheless, location and agglomeration of economic activity – until about 50 years ago – 
worked on the assumption that both capital and labour were location-bound, because firms and 
individuals showed little propensity to mobility. Thus, competitiveness was primarily shaped by 
the attributes of the location, and as locations evolved in the nature of their inherent strengths 
and weaknesses, the kind of economic activity based there also fluctuated.  This had obvious 
ramifications for the nature and extent of trade, and the conditions that permitted one region or 
country to be more successful than others.  
The evolution of the modern MNEi changed this with the growing level and intensity of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), intra-firm trade and complex sets of linkages amongst and 
between spatially dispersed economic actors. Mostly, this has gradually decoupled – but only to 
an extent – the severely linear relationship between the competitiveness of firms in a given 
location with the competitiveness of the location itself. That is to say, where capital and firms 
were physically static; the competitiveness of countries explained the competitiveness of firms 
located there, but rarely ever vice-versa (Vernon 1966). The firm as understood in this context 
was ‘generic’ in that it was neither multinational, nor multi-plant, and was by itself 
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organisationally and geographically a singularity, no different from other firms (Beugelsdijk et 
al. 2010). 
However, the MNE has become a complex organism, with an ability to spatially reorganise its 
activities (and across borders) – and with growing ease - to take advantage of differences in the 
quality, availability and price of location-bound assets, both within countries and across 
countries, and these multiple engagements are dynamic in the sense that they are continuously 
evolving (Dunning 1977; Dunning 1980). The more complex the MNE spatially and 
organisationally, the greater the need to interpret its interdependence with multiple locations and 
multiple contexts, each with differing degrees of embeddedness (Meyer et al. 2011). In short, 
locational characteristics (location (L) advantages) and the operations of the MNE (ownership 
(O) advantages) are concatenated, implying that they are inextricably linked together, yet are not 
the same object. The MNE has the potential to shape the characteristics of the location, as much 
as it is shaped by its milieu (Cantwell 1995).  
This multi-level complexity means that the study of location is no mere academic exploration, 
to explain the success and failure of nations and its industries with the hindsight afforded to us 
by history, for its own sake. Firms must make locational choices, and ‘wrong’ choices can be 
costly because they also imply other opportunities forgone. Firms are resource-constrained and 
have cognitive boundaries that shape what they can and cannot do, and this makes location 
decisions strategic in nature, and insinuates a micro-aspect to the study and understanding of 
location. Similarly, governments are able to shape their policies to determine their locational 
attractiveness, as firms and individuals have a growing degree of flexibility in selecting where 
(and where not) to locate, and perhaps more importantly what aspects of their value-adding 
activities to concentrate in which particular locations. This brings out the macro-level 
significance of the study of location.  
Engaging in high value adding activities implies higher competence levels (or in other words, 
greater O advantages) of MNE subsidiaries, which require L advantages that are non-generic in 
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nature and are often associated with agglomeration effects, clusters, and the presence of highly 
specialized skills (Lall and Pietrobelli 2002). Firms are constrained in their choice of location for 
high competence subsidiaries by the L advantages of the host location. For instance, R&D 
activities tend to be concentrated in few locations, because the appropriate specialized resources 
are associated with only few locations.  The embeddedness of firms is often a function of the 
duration of the MNEs’ presence, since firms tend to build incrementally (Håkanson and Nobel 
2001; Rabbiosi and Santangelo 2011). MNEs most often rely on L advantages that already exist 
in the host economy, and deepening of embeddedness occurs generally in response to 
improvements of the domestic technological capacity. However, while the scope of activities 
undertaken by a subsidiary can be modified more or less instantly, developing competence levels 
takes time (Cantwell and Mudambi 2005; Nobel and Birkinshaw 1998). MNE investments in 
high value-added activities (often associated with high competence levels) have the tendency to 
be ‘sticky’. Firms demonstrate greater inertia when it comes to relocating R&D activities. This 
reflects the high costs and considerable time required to develop linkages with the host country 
actors and institutions (Narula 2002).  
The complex interdependence between O and L advantages presents the MNE with a 
number of trade-offs when taking strategic decisions regarding the location of R&D. Firstly, 
MNEs need to decide whether to centralize or decentralize, Secondly, MNEs need to decide 
whether to spatially separate from or collocate with their rivals. Neither of these trade-offs are 
either/or decisions, nor are they diametrically opposed to each other.  However, as is often the 
case in the nature of trade-offs, the choice is shaped by constraints most often associated with 
cognitive limits to resources, the bounded rationality of firms, and the uncertainty inherent in 
innovation.   
This chapter addresses this topic in 5 sections. The next section discusses L and O 
advantages, providing a classification of and provides some novel insights into the interaction 
between the two. Section 3 focuses on innovation and location and explain the relevance of the 
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concept of and relationships between L and O advantages for R&D activity. The last two 
sections are concerned with the trade-off between centralization and decentralization, and spatial 
separation and collocation of R&D activity, respectively. 
 
Location and Ownership advantages – an updated set of definitions  
The essence of locational behaviour of MNEs (as well as other economic actors) reflects the 
interaction between O and L advantages (Cantwell 1995; Dunning 2008)).  
Ownership advantages are firm-specific in nature, and the competitiveness of firms is 
associated with the strength (or weakness) of their O advantages. In this instance, we use O 
advantages to refer to firm-specific assets that are essential in the generation of economic rent 
and/or market share retention/creation (Narula 2010). There are two primary types of O 
advantages (Dunning and Lundan 2008). The first are about assets in the sense of the ownership 
of physical equipment, intellectual property, or privileged access to tangible and intangible 
resources (which also include knowledge possessed by employees). Such assets include 
knowledge of how and where resources may be accessed in any give location, the costs of 
acquiring such assets in one location relative to alternative locations, the knowledge to organise 
multi-location operations, etc. These are asset-type O advantages (Oa). A second class of O 
advantages are transaction-type O advantages (Ot). These derive from 1) the knowledge to create 
efficient internal hierarchies (or internal markets) within the boundaries of the firm, and 2) being 
able to efficiently utilise external markets. Ot assets form a necessary and (sometimes) sufficient 
basis for a firm to remain competitive (Narula 2003). Ot advantages also include the knowledge 
of institutions, because familiarity of institutions plays an important part in reducing the 
coordination costs, shirking costs and other transaction costs (Narula 2010; Santangelo and 
Meyer 2011). However, they are rarely in themselves a source of rent generation.  It is important 
to distinguish between the O advantages of the MNE at large, and those associated with 
individual establishments or subsidiaries (Rugman and Verbeke 2001). Much of the early 
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literature on O advantages took a macro perspective, and given the nature of the typical MNE 
and its centralised management structure, at that time it was a reasonable assumption that the O 
advantages of the MNE were in principle available to and accessible by all subsidiaries. This, 
however, is increasingly hard to justify. The O advantages of the parent are not necessarily 
available to all its subsidiaries, and to each individual operating unit, and vice versa.   
L advantages are about the characteristics of specific locations, and are location-bound. 
Although it is increasingly popular to use country-specific assets as a synonym for L advantages 
(Rugman and Verbeke 1992), the term ‘L advantages’ allow us to clearly distinguish between the 
various units of analysis, such as the country, national sub-regional, or supra-national regionsii. It 
is well known that even within countries, regions compete for FDI by offering more attractive 
institutional frameworks (Hogenbirk 2002; Meyer and Nguyen 2005; Narula and Dunning 2010) 
. Supra-national regions also exist - such as the European Union (EU) – which provide an 
additional layer of policies, regulations, and laws. An MNE may engage with all three levels of L 
advantage. For instance, consider an MNE with a production site in Maastricht, in the 
Netherlands. The MNE will need to consider the L advantages of the Netherlands at large, the 
Limburg province, as well as that of the EU, in addition to the special status of Maastricht as part 
of the Meuse-Rhine Euregio, which addresses aspects peculiar to the contiguous multi-country 
border region of Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands.  
L advantages are a set of characteristics associated with a location, and are in principle 
accessible and applicable to all firms equally that are physically or legally established in that 
location. We say ‘in principle’ for three reasons. First, full information about L advantages 
associated with a specific location may not be readily available. Second, even where information 
is available, there may be costs associated with accessing this knowledge. This knowledge may 
be available to incumbents (whether domestic or foreign), by virtue of their existing activities on 
that location, and acquired through experience. Third, these L advantages may be made available 
differentially by the actions of governments that seek to restrict (or encourage) the activities of a 
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particular group of actors by introducing barriers to their use of certain L advantages.  These may 
be for commercial reasons, or for strategic reasons such as national defence, or reflect the 
influence of interest groups who are able to influence government policy.  These represent a 
subset of the ‘liability of foreignness’, when L advantages are available to local and foreign 
firms at differential costs (Zaheer 1995).  
Note that when location-bound assets are in the private domain (i.e., they are internalised by 
others), they are no longer L advantages but constitute O advantages, since they assist rent 
generation/market share retention by specific actors to the exclusion of other economic actors. 
Location advantages can be said to be ‘public’ because they are not private goods, but not always 
in the sense of being ‘public goods’ because they may not always be used without (some) 
detriment to their value to subsequent users. This aspect of L advantages will be discussed at 
length later. 
 
A classification of L and O advantages 
L advantages come in all shapes and sizes, and it is hard to make general statements and lists of 
all possible L advantages (although we try in Table 1!). This is because the L advantages 
relevant to a particular circumstance vary by a variety of MNE and affiliate-specific factors, such 
as the motive of the investment; the spatial, logistical and strategic relationships with other 
operations, both within the same MNE and outside the MNEs with other independent firms.  It is 
important to understand that L advantages are about relevant complementary assets outside the 
boundaries of the MNE (or other firm actors) that are location-bound.  We discuss this later, 
when we introduce the concept of collocation L advantages.  
Table 1 classifies L advantages into 3 broad categories – at the country, industry and firm 
level. For each of this category, we identify specific type of L advantages and related sources 
and provide examples. As we discuss below, these categories have a certain degree of overlap.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Country-level L advantages are ‘contextual’ in nature, in the sense that they provide the broad 
background of a location. They reflect the socio-economic and political environment that is 
relevant to any location. They remain macro and ‘generic’ because they are public or quasi-
public goods, and are relevant to all firms regardless of size, nationality, industry, or 
geographical unit of analysis. Some are exogenous, in the sense that they are independent of 
economic stage of development, and are the natural assets of the location, such as population, 
climate, accessibility, etc. Others are created assets but remain generic in the sense that they are 
expected to exist in all nation states although there are countries where the government is unable 
to provide these – basic infrastructure, legal and financial infrastructure, and regulation and 
policy frameworks. The last category represents knowledge infrastructure L advantages. 
‘Knowledge infrastructure’ as used here is ‘generic, multi-user and indivisible’ and consisting of 
public research institutes, universities, organisations for standards, intellectual property 
protection, etc. that enables and promotes science and technology development (Smith 1997). 
For obvious reasons, this can also be categorised as an industry-level L advantage, since such 
assets may be specifically geared to a particular set of industries.  
Industry-associated L advantages. In making an investment decision, MNEs seek specific, 
industry and market-related complementary assets. It is not enough, for instance, for an IT firm 
that is seeking to establish software design facilities that there is a large supply of low-wage 
university graduates, but that there is a large supply of IT graduates. Neither demand conditions 
nor market structure can be analysed using country-level L advantages. For a market-seeking 
investor, income distribution and the size of the specific market cannot be gauged from generic L 
advantages such as population. A luxury watch manufacturer will be interested in knowing the 
market for other luxury goods, and opportunities for distributing her goods through channels 
specific to luxury goods, and the competition within that specific sector. Industry policy may 
also be seen to be industry-specific, by definition. A location which is home to a cluster of firms 
in a similar industry is likely to have access to a number of suppliers in support and related 
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sectors. Governments may also provide specific incentives and policies to promote a specific 
sector, which may make a location more attractive for a specific industry, and not for others. 
In this chapter we define an important sub category of L advantages: collocation L 
advantages. Where important competitors in the same industry are collocated, there is an 
opportunity to get appropriately skilled and experienced potential workers, and the possibility of 
knowledge spillovers through mobile employees.  In short, these are L advantages that derive 
from the presence of other actors in the same industry that are collocated (see Table 1 for more 
details). These include the essence of other collocated firm’s O advantages, which contribute to 
the competitiveness of the location. 
Firm-associated L advantages. Although O advantages per se do not generate L advantages, 
the presence or absence of specific firms in a milieu can act as important inducements to 
collocate. The physical location of a lead-firm within a global production network acts as a 
powerful L advantage to its key suppliers. Others may seek specific L advantages to improve 
knowledge spillovers by being proximate to a market or industry leader. In this sense, L 
advantages overlap with O advantages, and differ from industry-associated L advantages. 
 
Informal institutions deserve special mention as an L advantage. Informal institutions (which 
may or may not be linked to current formal institutions) are routines, habits and procedures that 
are in common use and that shape the manner in which economic actors in a given location 
interact in practice. Formal institutions may prescribe one set of actions, but economic actors 
may utilise other institutions that are de facto, and not de jure. Knowledge of such institutions is 
also in principle available to all firms that seek to acquire this, but because informal institutions 
are largely tacit, physical proximity is crucial in their acquisition. In other words, they require 
some degree of embeddedness to acquire. Embeddedness in a location provides membership to a 
‘club’ of complex relationships with suppliers, customers and knowledge infrastructure through 
formal and informal institutions that have taken years to evolve a stock of knowledge that is only 
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available to members by virtue of their constant interaction (Forsgren et al. 2005). There are 
‘goods’ associated with these networks that are only available to those that are collocated, 
because they have evolved under the same informal institutions. Thus they are quasi-public 
goods, for which firms located there have invested in to acquire knowledge of these institutions 
(Narula and Santangelo 2009). Knowledge of institutions can indeed represent O advantages, but 
only where markets are closed. This is why some authors (e.g. Dunning and Lundan 2008) have 
classified them as O advantages, while others regard them to be L advantages (Narula 2010).  
It is worth highlighting the difference between location-bound O advantages and those that 
are non location-bound (Rugman and Verbeke 2001). Location bound O advantages allow the 
firm to be able to generate profits from these assets but only in a specific location. This may be 
due to government-induced incentives, such as privileged access to specific natural resources, to 
capital, or specific infrastructure. In other cases, market entry may be restricted providing the 
firm with a monopoly or a pseudo-monopoly, and consequent opportunities to generate rent (e.g., 
telecoms licenses, petroleum drilling rights). Location-bound O advantages may also derive from 
specific (non-government) L advantages which the firm is able to access only in the given 
location, the use of which requires physical presence in that specific location. Many MNEs are 
amongst the largest in their home markets, and are themselves part of large industrial groups 
(sometimes with cross-holdings and common ownership) with interests in several industries, and 
also derive location-bound O advantages from privileged access to intra-group transactions and 
intermediate goods within the same family of firms, but these advantages are not necessarily 
available when they move abroad (Narula and Nguyen 2011). These may also derive from 
knowledge of institutions, and by being an ‘insider’. By virtue of their size and importance in the 
home economy, they may have close relationships with state-owned organisations, ministries and 
policy makers, and are able to influence domestic policy, as well as the associated knowledge 
infrastructure to their own needs, and in many cases, these have evolved around and with their 
own domestic activities, often over a long period of time. Such linkages confer the basis to 
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generate economic rent for incumbents, and are a cost to new entrants or those less entrenched in 
the domestic milieu (Cantwell and Mudambi 2011). These advantages are not transferable to 
foreign markets, and establishing ‘membership’ in business and innovation networks in new 
locations is not costless (Narula 2002). 
Non location-bound O advantages derive from skills, technology or other knowledge which 
the firm possesses to the exclusion of other economic actors operating in the same location.  
Such O advantages also tend to be a function of the home country. Firms typically build their 
original resource endowments in their home country and this original resource endowment drives 
their international growth (Narula and Nguyen 2011; Tan and Meyer 2010). 
 
Interaction between L and O advantages 
There are circumstances where the differentiation between O and L advantages can be 
challenging, partly because of the interaction and concatenation of O and L advantages. Initial O 
advantages of any MNE derive from the L advantages of the home country, and as the work 
pioneered by Rugman and Verbeke (2003) has shown, many MNEs continue to show a strong 
bias towards their home regions. For firms that are beginning to internationalise, the dependence 
on the home country is especially strong (Narula 1996; Narula and Nguyen 2011). However, 
there is a certain degree of obfuscation that derives from taking an MNE-level perspective on L 
and O advantages, which requires the aggregation of individual operations. The O advantages of 
MNEs – once they become embedded in new locations abroad - are influenced by multiple sets 
of L advantages, and create the challenge of multiple embeddedness (Meyer et al. 2011).  
The MNE in any given location has to interact frequently with other actors in each host 
country, and additionally when it has multiple establishments, with multiple locations within the 
host country. Each interaction has the potential to change the knowledge base of all the 
participants, and by extension, the O advantages of the various participants. Where the domestic 
actors are locationally bound, this implies changes in the L advantages of the host country as 
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well. Such interactions vary in intensity, depending upon a variety of factors. In general, the 
greater the scope and competence of an MNE subsidiary in a given location, the greater the 
degree of embeddedness in the host location, and the greater the interaction with other actors in 
that location (Holm and Pedersen 2000). This implies managing a portfolio of subsidiary level 
activities in multiple, heterogeneous, local contexts and plays an important role in defining its O 
advantages (Figueiredo 2011). Figure 1 illustrates the complexities of this concept.  
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
In particular, the O advantages of any given subsidiary (‘subsidiary A’ in Figure 1) are shaped 
by: 
1. The parent firm. Since the O advantages of the parent firm are a function of the home 
country L advantages, by extension, the O advantages of subsidiary A are also greatly 
influenced by these L advantages;  
2. The extent to which the parent and the particular subsidiary are integrated. At the one 
extreme, a free-standing MNE may function as a completely autonomous set of 
subsidiaries with little or no intra-MNE interaction, and the O advantages of the 
subsidiary and the parent are independent sets. At the other extreme, the MNE may be 
completely integrated such that the O advantages of subsidiary A are a complete subset 
of the parent MNE; 
3. The extent to which subsidiary A is embedded in the host country. This reflects a variety 
of factors. The quality of the linkages are associated with the scope and competence level 
of the subsidiary (Santangelo 2009), and these in turn are co-determined by a variety of 
factors (for an extensive discussion see Narula and Bellak 2009). These include MNE 
internal factors such as their internationalization strategy, the role of the location in their 
global portfolio of subsidiaries, and the motivation of the investment, in addition to the 
available location-specific resources which can be used for that purpose (Benito et al. 
2003). 
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4. The relative strength of the association with other subsidiaries. Specific subsidiaries may 
function within a regional structure, along functional lines, or within a specific integrated 
product or supply chain. In such instances, the relationship with subsidiary B may be 
much more intensive than within the parent firm. As such, the O advantages of subsidiary 
A may be influenced to a greater extent by the O advantages of subsidiary B, and the L 
advantages associated with location B. 
The subsidiary has to balance the forces that require local responsiveness to its host milieu, with 
those that emanate from the parent MNE which may require the subsidiaries’ integration within 
the MNE’s overall structure.  Given that many larger MNEs are a complex aggregation of a large 
number constituent subsidiaries, such multiple embeddedness generates trade-offs between 
external and internal embeddedness, since each subsidiary must reconcile the interests of its 
parent with those of its local business interests.    
This implies – from the perspective of the interaction of the more global MNE – that its 
portfolio of O advantages are a complex blend of those derived from multiple contexts (Meyer et 
al. 2011), and therefore a complex set of L advantages of different locations. In each location, it 
absorbs and adapts its O advantages in response both to the L advantages available, and through 
linkages with collocated firms adapts as well to the O advantages of these unaffiliated firms.  
Note that by joining an agglomeration, the MNE itself become part of an agglomeration, and 
therefore enhances the L advantages of the host location for other firms.  
 
Innovation and location 
The literature on motivation of R&D activities is reasonably well developed, and we will not 
seek to revisit it, focusing instead on the broad dichotomy of asset-augmenting and asset-
exploiting R&D motivations (Dunning and Narula 1995, Kuemmerle 1999), and its relationship 
with motivation of more general FDI activities of MNEs (Dunning 1993). It is important in this 
context to note that in certain industries and sectors, R&D performs a subordinate and supportive 
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role to ‘mainstream’ activities such as production and sales, while in others, R&D is a primary 
input to these activities (Figure 2a,b). For instance, in sectors such as software and 
pharmaceuticals, R&D is a primary input to the firm’s primary function, while in sectors such as 
paper products, R&D is a supportive. In addition, increasingly firms are engaged in rationalising 
their activities globally, so as to maximise the link with specific value adding activities and 
locations which have specific competitive and comparative advantages. This has led to a 
tendency amongst MNEs to ‘break-up’ their value chains and locate specific aspects in particular 
locations for purposes of maximum efficiency (Mudambi 2008). As such, few locations host all 
parts of the value chain of one product for any given MNE, leading to an agglomeration of 
specific types of activities in particular locations. Prior to economic liberalization, MNEs 
responded to investment opportunities primarily by establishing truncated miniature replicas of 
their facilities at home, although the extent to which they are truncated varied considerably 
between countries (Papanastassiou and Pearce 1999). The extent of truncation was determined 
by a number of factors, but by far the most important determinant of truncation - and thereby the 
scope of activities and competence level of the subsidiary - were associated with market size, 
and capacity and capability of domestic industry (Dunning and Narula 2004). 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
MNEs may seek to engage in R&D in response to specific L advantages because R&D is 
more demand oriented. This may reflect, for instance, large markets, or scarce natural resources 
that are location-bound. These promote the outwards spread of production, sales and other value 
adding activities where MNEs attempt to exploit their existing assets and competences in 
conjunction with these L advantages. In such cases, innovation is undertaken in order to adapt 
existing products and services to local stimuli. Such R&D facilities tend to be relatively low 
knowledge-intensive, and remain somewhat footloose, requiring greater integration with the 
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parent firm as well as the market, rather than a focus on the knowledge asset L advantages of the 
host country (Table 1). Such asset-exploiting activities is subordinate to the MNE’s market-
seeking FDI activities, in that R&D follows (perhaps reluctantly) the location of other aspects the 
value chain. In such instances, the MNE’s R&D activities are primarily determined by the same 
L advantages that shape their other activities, although not at the same intensity or timing. 
An important set of L advantages for R&D activity are associated with the interaction 
between the knowledge infrastructure-related L advantages of locations, and the L advantages 
that derive from the O advantages of firms already based in these locations (e.g., collocation L 
advantages). These in turn are strongly associated with L advantages that derive from knowledge 
of institutions. Note that the institutions themselves are L advantages, while the knowledge of 
these institutions is an O advantage. These particular L advantages play a preeminent role in 
shaping the location of innovation in three sets of circumstances. First, where MNE R&D is 
asset-augmenting in motivation and essentially represent supply-driven R&D. Second, in 
market-seeking MNE activity where R&D is central (rather than subordinate) to the primary 
value adding activities of firms. Third, where the MNE’s activity are tightly linked and 
interdependent with other collocated firms’ activities, as in the case with supply chains, 
production networks and keiretsu.  All three share another common feature: the importance of 
the role of institutions, and the knowledge of these institutions.  
The systems of innovation literature can be useful to understand this dynamic (Lundvall 
1992). In particular, this stream of research builds on the principle that innovation is a collective 
process, which involves firms as well as other actors such as policy makers, universities, public 
research centres, investment banks, etc.iii. These actors are bound together through rules, 
routines, habits and procedures which may be formal or informally defined, but that shape the 
nature and extent of interaction between the various parties. This ties into the idea propagated by 
Marshall (1920) about successful agglomerations - something that is ‘in the air’, a stock of 
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knowledge that is only available to members with a particular location-specific absorptive 
capacity by virtue of their constant interaction.  
Whatever the geographical unit of analysis, a systems view builds around the important 
principle that knowledge diffusion between actors in geographical proximity foster innovation. 
Where knowledge is being exchanged, and this knowledge has a strong tacit nature, “physical” 
or geographical proximity eases knowledge transmission (e.g. Blanc and Sierra 1999). 
Knowledge spillovers tend indeed to be more intense between parties that are located close to 
each other in space (e.g. Jaffe and Trajtenberg 1996; Jaffe and Trajtenberg 1998; Jaffe et al. 
1993; Maurseth and Verspagen 2002). Thus, MNEs are typically located in a particular location 
because of such L advantages, which often include quasi-public goods provided though 
universities and public research institutes (Asheim and Gertler 2006). The point here is that 
proximity, linkages and institutions are inextricably tied together, and that especially where 
innovation (which has a tacit aspect) is concerned, firms share an inertia in seeking alternative 
locations.  
 
 
 
MNEs and the trade-off between centralization and decentralization 
The innovation activities of MNEs follow the same general logic as other value adding activities, 
in that they require access to specific L advantages.  However, the nature of innovation and its 
strategic significance to the long-term well-being of the MNE means that MNEs have been more 
reluctant to internationalize R&D then other aspects of the value chain  (Narula and Zanfei 2004)  
Nonetheless, there is compelling evidence that this is changing as well, albeit much more 
cautiously, and with a time lag relative to other aspects of the value chain.  
The issue of location in the innovatory activities of MNEs is a complex one. At the most 
elementary level, MNEs face the dual and (sometimes) opposing challenges of centralization and 
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decentralization (Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers 2007), although the contradictions between 
the two are not necessarily always as stark – firms seek to do both simultaneously, depending 
upon the motivation of the R&D, and the centrality of R&D to the primary value adding 
activities of the MNE. The willingness or reluctance to internationalize is due to a number of 
factors. First, the strategic importance of R&D means that firms may wish to exert as much 
control over the process by keeping R&D close to headquarters which can assure an optimal 
level of monitoring and control over its activities. Second, there is a minimum efficient scale 
associated with R&D activities.  Given the relatively high costs of R&D, MNEs prefer to 
maintain a single (or as few) R&D facilities to reduce costs. Small firms are constrained by their 
limited resources – the expansion of R&D activities- both at home and in overseas locations 
requires considerable resources both in terms of capital investment, and managerial resources 
which these firms simply do not have. Ceteris paribus, large firms have more money and 
resources to use on overseas activity. Third, a dispersion of R&D activities across the globe also 
requires extensive coordination between them – and particularly with headquarters- if they are to 
function in an efficient manner with regards to the collection and dissemination of information. 
Internal proximity between R&D and the rest of the MNE is an important issue (Blanc and 
Sierra 1999).Spatially distributed R&D requires the establishment and management of networks 
internal to the firm, in addition to those between external networks and internal networks, and 
require complex coordination if they are to provide optimal benefits (Narula and Zanfei 2004). 
Such networks are not only difficult to manage, but also require considerable resources (both 
managerial and financial). Managing spatially dispersed R&D – even within the same 
organisation – is suboptimal, due to knowledge internal stickiness (Szulanski 1996). Thus firms’ 
default option is to maintain R&D in as few locations as possible, and to maintain strategic 
control by concentrating it close to headquarters.  
Fourth, there are industry-specific reasons that may encourage or discourage 
centralization. The maturity of the core technology and its characteristics, determines the extent 
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to which the innovation process can be internalised (Narula 2003; Teece 1986) and 
geographically dispersed (Cantwell and Santangelo 1999; Cantwell and Santangelo 2000). Most 
mature technologies evolve slowly and demonstrate minor but consistent innovations over time. 
The technology is to a great extent codifiable, widely disseminated, and the property rights well-
defined. Intra-industry competition emphasises price and therefore economies of scale. In the 
extreme – as in many resource-extractive industries - downstream activities add most value with 
the natural resource being priced as a commodity.  These sectors do not require outputs to be 
tailored to customers to the same extent, or as quickly. This means that constant and close 
interaction between customers is not an important determinant of R&D. Profits of firms are 
highly dependent on the costs of inputs, and proximity to the source of these inputs is often more 
significant than that of customers. On the other extreme, rapidity of technological change in 
‘newer’ technologies require a closer interaction between production and R&D. Technologies 
has a higher tacit, uncodifiable element, and this requires a closer coordination between users 
and producers of innovation.  
In addition, though, supply-side considerations are especially important in asset-augmenting 
innovation. To engage in more intensive activities such as research (as opposed to development), 
complementary assets are necessary. These assets can be best described as non-generic, 
knowledge-intensive L advantages, which the firm cannot have access (or as cheaply) to in its 
home base (or other locations). Thus, MNEs need to access ‘unique’ or scarce L advantages to 
do with the knowledge infrastructure and specialized sources of knowledge that may be either 
firm-specific and location-bound, or location-specific and available to all. In the case of asset-
augmenting activity, MNEs may situate (or seek to establish) themselves in particular locations 
to (and in some cases only to) undertake innovation because of specific location-bound assets 
provided through the innovation system. Such innovation activities are more of the nature of 
stand-alone R&D facilities which are considerably knowledge intensive, and imply a 
considerably greater dependence on domestic knowledge sources and infrastructure.  
19 
 
 
MNEs and the trade-off between spatial separation and collocation 
Most theoretical perspectives (such as the innovation systems literature) provide arguments in 
favour of firms locating in close spatial proximity, particularly for R&D. However, recent 
research has provided a number of arguments challenging this view. 
First, while all firms in principle seek to have positive inflows of knowledge, few firms wish 
to be the source of (unintended) knowledge outflows (Alcácer 2006; Santangelo 2011). Although 
in the case of R&D (compared to sales or manufacturing) there is a greater active interest in 
seeking spillovers, this tendency reflects the capabilities of the firm. R&D tends to be more 
concentrated relative to manufacturing and sales, but more-capable firms collocate less than less-
capable firms, regardless of the activity. In other words, firms may seek to avoid collocation of 
R&D to minimise leakages of value assets. Even where spillovers are the objective, being co-
located is not always necessary. Of course, this varies considerably by industry, particularly in 
sectors where the tacit aspect is considerable. Tacit knowledge is much more difficult to 
exchange or trade, and, as a result, tends to be sticky and geographically less mobile. In 
industries where the tacit aspect is considerable, ceteris paribus, the propensity to geographically 
concentrate is higher (Iammarino and McCann 2006) than in sectors where the knowledge being 
exchanged is codifiable. This is especially so in oligopolistic industries (as opposed to industries 
with a competitive market structure) where loss to rivals is perceived as costly, and the private 
good aspect of knowledge is more important than the public good aspect  (Iammarino and 
McCann 2006; McCann and Mudambi 2005). Empirical evidence has shown that the 
involvement of firms in clusters is extremely sensitive to the nature of the industry structure in 
which the firm operates (Cantwell and Kosmopoulou 2002). That is, firms operating in the same 
R&D-intensive oligopolistic industry tend to spatially separate their core innovative activity 
(Cantwell and Santangelo 2002). Unintended knowledge outflows from a firm can be quite 
valuable to its direct competitors and can therefore be important not to locate close to rivals 
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(Cantwell and Santangelo 2002), or it may result in an adverse selection of collocated firms 
(Shaver and Flyer 2000). Thus, for oligopolistic industries, although the choice of R&D location 
is important in determining the capabilities of firms and their access to ‘members only’ public 
goods, collocating with rivals is not always the preferred option. Technically advanced firms 
prefer being proximate to universities, and are disinterested in locating close to other firms in the 
same industry, whereas less competitive firms prefer to locate close to rivals (Alcácer and Chung 
2007). 
Second, firms do not always collocate because they wish to benefit from knowledge transfers 
(intended or unintended), but simply to have access to the same location-specific assets (such as 
skilled labour), which may be achieved by staying broadly in the same regional vicinity 
(Cantwell and Iammarino 2003). When, however, the local system provides a combination of 
factors that contributes to innovation (such as skills, finance, production, user-producer 
linkages), the fear of knowledge spillovers to competitors may be counterbalanced by location-
bound (i.e., associated with firm specific advantages) or location-specific factors, and intra-
industry spatial concentration then takes place. Firms – whether they are technological leaders or 
followers – often have little choice in their location, and may in fact be collocated in a cluster by 
virtue of their history, or because of the presence of an important university or public research 
establishment. In particular, firms often locate their R&D to take advantage of a specific 
scientific specialization of a university or public research establishment. The number of 
specialized universities and institutes in a given scientific field are finite, so even where a 
technological leader would prefer to avoid spatial proximity with its less-able rivals, it cannot 
prevent these firms from collocating in order to establish embedded relationships with these 
institutions. Thus, once competitors collocate, the decision to embed locally in order to access 
local complementary knowledge depends on entry motivations and firms capabilities since such 
a decision may bring about risks of unintended knowledge spillovers (Perri et al. 2011; 
Santangelo 2011). In particular, when domestic actors are valuable in terms of knowledge, rivals 
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entering the market with a competence-creating motivation (as opposed to a non-competence-
creating motivation) embed in the host economy as their expected payoffs of embeddedness 
exceed those of isolation (Santangelo 2011). Moreover, empirical evidence documents that 
highly capable firms invest more on the relationships with local partners under conditions of low 
competition, but they also reduce their commitment more to such relationships when the 
perceived pressure from the competitive environment exceeds a certain threshold as a result of 
potential loss from outward spillovers (Perri et al. 2011). 
Third, few technological leaders have superior capabilities in all sub-sectors, and may require 
complementary resources from their rivals. Alliances allow firms to effectively engage in 
knowledge exchange without the hazard of unintended knowledge spillovers (Narula and 
Santangelo 2009). Firms are unable to properly protect their technological assets which they 
intentionally or unintentionally share with their neighbours, even though formal property rights 
have been obtained. This is particularly the case when they are geographically close since, while 
the marginal cost of transmitting codified knowledge across geographic space does not depend 
on distance, the marginal cost of transmitting tacit knowledge increases with distance (Criscuolo 
and Verspagen 2008). The co-location of innovation activities therefore implies potential threat 
to competitive advantage of co-located rivals. This argument applies especially to alliances 
between firms operating in the same industry and core technological fields. In such cases, the 
need for closely monitoring knowledge transmission is greater, the higher the degree of 
competition, since co-located rival firms with technologically similar profiles compete both in 
the output market and the technological realm (Narula and Santangelo 2009). Therefore, in these 
cases partnerships enable firms to directly monitor their co-located market and technological 
rivals as well as to access possible complementary capabilities. 
 
Implications and avenues for future research 
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We have sought here to examine certain current issues in the role of location advantages in 
the spatial distribution of MNE R&D activity. In doing so, we have returned to first principles by 
revisiting our understanding of L and O advantages and their interaction. This interaction lies at 
the heart of innovation studies, economic geography and the economics of innovation (which 
takes a policy view of the competitiveness of locations), as well as innovation and strategic 
management (which take a firm-level perspective on the competitiveness of firms).  
Returning to key insights from these related disciplines, we have revisited the meaning of L 
and O advantages, as opposed to their definitions. This has required us to return to the oft-cited 
(but underutilised) differentiation between country, industry and firm-level issues, and offer a 
succinct differentiation of L advantages. Taking a systems view has allowed us to emphasise the 
importance of institutions, and flesh out the concept of collocation L advantages, which play an 
important role at the industry and firm levels of analysis. Just because a country possesses 
certain L advantages when viewed at a macro-level, does not imply that these are available to all 
industries or all firms in that country without differential cost. When these are linked to the 
distinction between location-bound and non location-bound O advantages, and when we 
distinguish between the portfolio of assets available by MNEs and its individual subsidiaries and 
establishments, it allows for a clearer understanding of the challenges the modern MNE faces in 
managing its spatially distributed activities.  
These have been discussed in the context of R&D, which – in addition to the usual 
uncertainties faced by firms – must deal with the uncertainties associated with innovation. These 
have to do with the nature of knowledge, and how these inherent characteristics determine 
effective knowledge flows within the MNE, as well as with other actors that make up the host 
location. Although prior literature has sometimes framed the centralisation/decentralisation, 
spatial separation/collocation debates as a paradox facing firms, we feel that when viewed within 
the context of the cognitive limits to resources, the complexities of institutions, and the glacial 
pace of the evolving specialisation of locations, these are in actuality trade-offs firms must make. 
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It has not been our intention to provide a complete synopsis of the literature in this area, nor is 
it possible to raise all aspects of the conceptual and empirical lacunae that arise, but we shall 
offer a few suggestions. 
First, neither the IB nor the innovation studies literature has as yet come to terms with the 
growing use of non-equity modes in cooperative R&D, and the role of location. Social network 
theory remains on the fringes of this research, and relatively little effort has been made to marry 
the seeming contradictions between the global nature of R&D cooperation and the stickiness of 
locations (Narula and Santangelo 2009). The overlapping of complex supply chains, production 
networks and MNEs within and across locations presents a tapestry of establishments that is not 
as yet fully understood.  Where are the boundaries of the firm where non-equity suggests legal 
separation and separate ownership, but where control suggests a de facto single organisation?   
This raises an interesting second line of future enquiry. This fuzziness of boundaries of the 
firm has implications for the fuzziness of boundaries of countries. Policy makers have fewer 
tools at their disposal in building up the competitive advantage of individual nations where 
MNEs operate with alacrity across borders. Regulation, industrial policy and investment 
promotion no longer function as effectively (Narula 2003, Narula and Dunning 2010).  
Third, the study of motives for MNE activity – while useful in providing texture to the 
discussion – is poorly understood conceptually, and the broad motivational arguments from 
Dunning (1993) are in need of revision. To cite a simple example, asset-exploiting and asset-
augmenting activity are rarely done exclusively, and this is increasingly so.  
Fourth, the last two decades has seen a vigorous discussion of the benefits of clustering. How 
does spatial separation matter to firms in other aspects of the value chain? Does the propensity to 
collocate vary by size of firm, and industry? Under what circumstances is collocation more 
important, and when does spatial separation represent a superior option? 
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Table 1 A classification of L advantages  
 TYPE OF L 
ADVANTAGES 
SOURCES OF L 
ADVANTAGES EXAMPLE OF L ADVANTAGES 
 
Exogenous L 
advantages 
These derive from natural 
assets (independent of 
development stage) 
Sociological/anthropological 
- Culture, norms, religion, political 
stability.  
- Land availability, rainfall, climate, 
extractive resources, basic population 
- Proximity and accessibility to other 
markets 
 
Fundamental L 
advantages 
 
 
 
Basic infrastructure 
- Primary schools 
- Health care 
- Transport  (roads, railways) 
- Utilities (electricity, water) 
- Telecoms 
- Ports 
- Efficient bureaucracy 
- Public transport 
 Legal infrastructure - Legal system 
- Security and police 
- Tariff system 
- Property rights 
- Tax and excise  
 Regulation and policy  - Incentives 
- Subsidies 
- Tax holidays 
- Regulatory agencies 
- Industrial policy 
- Competition policy 
- Capacity to enforce regulation 
 Financial infrastructure - Banking, insurance, stock exchange 
 Knowledge asset 
L-advantages 
Knowledge infrastructure - Tertiary education, universities 
- Public research institutes 
 
Structural L 
advantages 
Market and demand 
structure 
- Income distribution 
- Size of potential market 
- Wage rates 
- Skilled employee mobility/scarcity 
 
Collocation L 
advantages 
L advantages that derive 
from the presence of other 
actors in the same location 
- Agglomeration economies 
- Networks of suppliers 
- Networks of customers 
- Level of intra-industry competition 
- Concentration ratio 
- Market size and potential 
- Presence of support industries (inter-
industry) 
  Industrial policy - Specific policies associated with given 
industry 
  L advantages that derive 
from location-bound O 
advantages of other actors 
- Presence of significant customer 
- Presence of significant supplier 
 
   
Industry-level 
L advantages  
Firm-associated L 
advantages 
Macro-region/country 
level L advantages 
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Figure 1 Multinational Enterprises and Local Context 
 
 
 
Source: Meyer et al (2011) 
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Figure 2a: a value chain where R&D is subordinate to the primary value adding function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2b: a value chain where R&D is central to the primary value adding function 
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i In this chapter we intentionally exclude the free-standing international company. 
ii The use of the term ‘advantage’ is also troublesome, and reflects the path dependency of the eclectic paradigm and 
its provenance as an extension of trade theory (Dunning 1977). It implies – in the same sense as comparative and 
absolute advantage – the relative strength or weakness of economic activity within a specific industry within a 
specific location (rather than between or relative to other locations).  The term advantage also implies a subjective 
assessment, and as such we think it preferable to use the term ‘characteristics’. In this chapter we shall use location 
advantage and locational characteristics as synonyms. 
iii Although the concept of cluster à la Porter takes a broadly similar view (Porter 1980; Porter 1986, 1990), it has 
been criticised for being too general. The concept of clusters in innovation has been fleshed out by Iammarino and 
McCann (2006) classify three types of clusters depending on the nature of innovation processes and structural 
conditions under which technical change occurs across space.  
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